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Spence J. quotes Lord Macmillan in the Van den Bergh case:
But even if payment is measured by annual receipts it s not necessarly
itself an item of income. As Lord Buckmaster pointed out in the case of
Glenboig Union Fireclay Co. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 1922
S.C. (H.L.) 112, 115. 'There is no relation between the measure that Is
used for the purpose of calculating a particular result8 and the quality
of the figure that is arrived at by means of that test.'

The majority may have had sound reasons for deciding that the
$300,000 was profit but the argument to the contrary is not answered.
It is ignored.
The key point of difference between the majority and dissenting
judgments lies in the characterization of the transaction as a dissolution or the sale of a share in a partnership. All the remaining differences flow from that. The sole criticism to be levelled at the
majority is the ipse dixit form of its opinion. No law is cited having
a bearing on the vital matter of characterization, and no comment of
any kind is made on the Respondent's contentions or the authorities
cited in support of them. These authorities are neither criticized nor
distinguished. No notice is taken of them at all. The effect of the
decision is that for reasons best known to the majority judges the
line of reasoning supporting the view of the transaction as the sale
of a share in a partnership is not applicable to the situation where
the 'sale' is not entirely voluntary and one of the partners continues
to carry on the partnership business.

LABOUR LAW
Jarvis v. Associated Medical Services Incorporated [1964] S.C.R. 497.
Ross JUDGE*
LABOUR LAW -

CERTIORARI -

EFFECT OF PRIVATIVE CLAUSE.

There is a present fear among members of the labour bar in
Ontario that procedure and substantive law in the labour field is,
in the case of the former, becoming too formal and legalistic, and in
the case of the latter, being too greatly influenced by the courts and
their concept of the law. The result is that too little care is being
lavished on the general policy of the Labour Relations Act, the settlement of industrial disputes.
At least three reasons can be presented to explain this state of
affairs. Although lawyers are not by any means exclusively used in
8 Supra, footnote 1 at 190.

*Mr. Judge is a third year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
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this field, there is a very high percentage of them and they tend to
apply their craft to the problems they meet.
Secondly, and perhaps more important, the historical background
of labour legislation in Ontario influences the present situation. On
April 14th, 1943, the Ontario Collective Bargaining Act was enacted
and along with it an amendment was made to the Judicature Act
providing for a branch of the High Court of Ontario to be known as
The Labour Court. Under section 21 of the Collective Bargaining
Act rules of procedure were drawn up and although the Court was
given some lattitude in this area, it largely retained the character of
a judicial forum. No particular judges were appointed to the Court,
but a scheme was set up whereby the judges rotated in two week
sessions. This system proved to be unsatisfactory, as one can imagine.
The judges, some well on in years, were out of touch with the labour
situation and out of sympathy with the purposes of the legislation.
The formalism of court procedure meant that the process was not
nearly as summary as it ideally should have been. The procedures for
fact finding in the Court were not well suited to the labour situation.
The judges did not sit with the Court long enough to develop any
expertise in labour matters. In brief, proceedings before the Labour
Court were often a frustrating experience. Bora Laskin foresaw the
problem in 1943, writing:
It might be said, without disrespect, that the novelty of the legislation
so far as the judicial art is concerned and unfamiliarity with its underlying assumptions posed a difficult task for many of the judges and a
no less difficult one for members of the bar ....
While one result of the
Act has been to give the legal profession a new sphere of action, it will
be unfortunate if the strictly legalistic approach stultifies the aim of
the Act to establish a regime of peaceful collective bargaining relations
in accordance with the wishes of the employees.1
The Labour Court was done away with and replaced by the
Labour Relations Board but many of the concepts and procedures of
the Court were carried into the new organ by personnel who had been
with the Court.
Probably the most important legalistic and formalizing influence
on the Labour Relations Board is the fear of judicial review by the
courts of the Board's decisions. Time and time again the Board has
been slapped on the wrist by the courts, and this in the face of a
most formidable privative clause.
The general right of the courts to review decisions of the administration was stated by Lord Atkin in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners:
Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division. 2
1 Laskin, Collective Bargaining in Ontario. A New Legislative Approach
(1943) 21 Can. Bar. Rev. 500.
2 Rex v. Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K.B. 171 at 205.
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It does not appear to me that the above quotation implies a
right by the court to consider the Board's decision by way of certiorari
when the Legislature has expressly forbidden the courts to apply
certiorarito the decision. Ross Anderson put the case very well:
Parliament is prepared to trust the tribunal to deal with particular sets
of circumstances which, in its wisdom, it considers can be better dealt
with by the special tribunal than by an ordinary court or by ordinary
administrative or legislative processes. Why should it not also trust the
tribunal to determine for itself the limits of its jurisdiction in the light
of the specific directions given to it by Parliament? If the tribunal does
seriously disregard those directions it must be assumed that Parliament
itself will soon provide a remedy. This interpretation has the double
advantage of avoiding logical difficulties and of avoiding also the creation
of a conflict between Parliament and Court, a conflict which particularly
in the realm of industrial relations, where finality and expedition of
decision 3are of the utmost importance, may have serious social consequences.
Bora Laskin in referring to the Canadian scene stated:
. . there is no constitutional principle on which courts can rest any
claim to review administrative board decisions. In so far as such review
is based on the historic supervisory authority of superior courts through
the use of prerogative writs of certiorarior mandamus, or their modern
equivalents, it must bow to the higher authority of a legislature to
withdraw this function from them. The question would then4 become
whether the legislature has used apt words to effect this result.
*

He goes on to conclude from an extensive review of the cases
that no form of words would be sufficient to oust judicial review
against the wishes of the courts. He states that jurisdiction has
become a "convenient umbrella" under which the courts justify their
right to continually intervene. The only way to stop this intervention
would appear to be to couch the decisions and conduct the procedure
of the Board according to judicial formulas. This is a conclusion that
is being drawn more and more and so the Board is becoming inhibited
to the point that we might as well give the whole issue back to the
courts if they are to persist in their intervention.
The trend in the cases since 1948 when Laskin wrote his article
on "The Apparent Futility of Privative Clauses" has not changed
as is witnessed by the recent case handed down by the Supreme Court
of Canada, Jarvisv. Associated Medical Services Incorporated.5 Initially the Ontario Labour Relations Board decided that Mrs. Jarvis,
although a person exercising managerial functions, was entitled to a
limited protection under the Ontario Labour Relations Act. The
Supreme Court decided that once the Board concluded that she was
not an employee as opposed to a person having a managerial function,
the Board had demonstrated its lack of jurisdiction and so could not
render the decision. Section 80 of the Act reads:
80. No decision, order, direction, declaration or ruling of the Board
shall be questioned or reviewed in any court, and no order shall be made
Ross Anderson (1950) 1 University of Queensland Law Journal 39 at 50.
Laskin, The Apparent Futility of Privative Clauses (1952) 30 Can. Bar
Rev. 986 at 989.
5 [1964] S.C.R. 497.
3
4
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or process entered, or proceedings taken in any court, whether by way
of injunction, declaratory judgment, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto, or otherwise, to question, review, prohibit or restrain the
Board or any of its proceedings.
It appears to me quite astounding that in the light of that
section, the court could have considered the case at all. It would
appear that a privative clause is indeed futile. The theory upon which
the court exercises a right to consider these cases was stated in
Bunbury v. Fullerin 1853.
Now it is a general rule that no court of limited jurisdiction can give
itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits
of the case upon which the limits to its jurisdiction depend, and however its decision may be final on all particulars making up together that
subject matter which, if true, is within its jurisdiction, and, however
necessary in many cases it may be for it to make a preliminary inquiry,
whether some collateral matter be or be not within the limits, yet, upon
this preliminary question, its decisions must always be open to enquiry
in the supreme court.6
E. F. Whitmore made reference to this principle and said that
certiorariwill lie even if the error on the collateral issue is not apparent on the face of the record. The decision of the Board loses

its impregnability if it relates to a jurisdictional point. A collateral
question is a preliminary question that must first be decided before
the Board can hear the case on the merits. In this case it was whether
Barbara Jarvis was entitled, as managerial staff, to the protection of

the Ontario Labour Relations Act.
It appears to me that comments made in the dissenting decisions

of Abbot & Judson J.J. completely answer the above argument. Abbot
J. reasoned that:
A board such as the Labour Relations Board, experienced in the field of
Labour Management Relations, representing both organized employers,
organized labour, and the public, and presided over by a legally trained
chairman, ought to be at least as competent and as well suited to determine questions arising in the course of the administration of the Act as
a Superior Court Judge.
In enacting S. 80, the Legislature has recognized that fact and has
indicated in the clearest possible language that the workings of the
Board are not to be unnecessarily impeded by legal technicalities. The
duty of the Courts is to apply that section, not to attempt to circumvent
it.7

Judson J. states at page 509 of the report that:
In enacting S. 80 of the Labour Relations Act the Legislature has
recognized that decisions made by the Board may involve what are
looked upon by a Court as jurisdictional errors. The Legislature has said
that it prefers to have these errors stand rather than have the decisions
quashed on certiorari....
But if the Legislature takes away the remedy
of certiorari,it must be dealing with this so-called jurisdictional error,
8
for the correction of jurisdictional error is the only purpose of certiorari.

Cartwright J. said that in his opinion the construction put on
the Statute by the Board was directly opposed to the general policy
Bunbury v. FuZler (1853), 156 E.R. 47.
Supra, footnote 5 at 506.
8 Id., at 509-10.
6
7
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of the Statute. But surely it is up to the Board, which works with the
legislation every day, to decide what its policy is. Surely the Board
is more expert in these matters than the court. In this vein Laskin
commented:
If we are to have judicial review, let it be as an open avowal of Its
desirability. By circumventing the privative clause, courts needlessly and
gratuitously involve themselves in issues of policy. It may be urged,
with justification, that all judicial work exhibits such involvment, but
erosion of privative clauses through specious interpretations and unsupported assumptions is a trespass on the policy functions of another agency
. . In the face of such enactments, judicial persistence in exercising a
reviewing power involves an arrogation of authority only on the basis
of constitutional principle (and there is no such principle) or on the
basis of some "elite" theory of knowing what is best for all concerned. 9
*

It is sometimes argued that the legislatures enact legislation with
privative clauses in the knowledge of the way in which the courts
treat them. In this way if the legislature does not change the privative
clause after it has been interpreted away by the courts then they
imply their agreement with the way in which the courts have
treated the clauses. This theory was probably first enunciated by
Lord Hasbury in Webb v. Outrim'0 and it was adopted by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Street v. Ottawa Valley Power Co." I only wish
to point out that in this case a more likely solution is that the Legislature does not wish to engage in open conflict with the courts.
Looking at privative clauses throughout Canada and their history
one can see a continual attempt on the part of legislatures to perfect
privative clauses and in fact a tension does exist between the courts
and the legislatures over who will control the policy of the administrative boards.
It does not appear as if any wording will prevent the courts
from reviewing administrative decisions. The privative clause alone
does not appear to be sufficient. Probably legislation providing an
administrative appeal procedure as well as a privative clause would
succeed. It is absolutely necessary that the Labour Relations Board
should not be hardened into the court's mold for the great advantage
of the administrative agency is that it is less formal, more pliable, and
accordingly better suited to the dynamic field of Labour Relations.
Formalism will simply result in extra-legal action by labour or management if the result of formalism is undue technicality and time
consuming procedure. Again the Board has expertise in labour matters
and it often decides cases on the basis of its expertise. It recognizes
badges of conduct and is ready to draw inferences from various fact
situations. All this will be destroyed by enforced parallelism with
the courts.

9 Laskin, supra footnote 4 at 991.
11 [1940] S.C.R. 40.
10 [1907] A.C. 81.

